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A commentary on
On the similarity between syntax and
actions
by Moro, A. (2014a). Trends Cogn. Sci. 18,
109–110. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2013.11.006
Response to Pulvermüller: the syntax of
actions and other metaphors
by Moro, A. (2014b). Trends Cogn. Sci. 18,
221. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2014.01.012
The syntax of action
by Pulvermüller, F. (2014). Trends Cogn.
Sci. 18, 219. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2014.01.001
Pulvermüller (2014) and Moro (2014a,b)
exchange views on the possible relation
between syntax and action. Pulvermüller
points out that human’s action displays
hierarchical and embedding properties,
analogous to how a sentence is orga-
nized by the human mind. His claim is
that syntax may not be as sui generis
as syntacticians upheld. As more evi-
dence reveals the neurobiological mech-
anisms underlying animals’ actions and
perceptions (Pulvermüller and Fadiga,
2010), Pulvermüller expects that mech-
anisms which describe the animal com-
binatorial capacity for action can find a
meaningful counterpart in syntax. Indeed,
this alleged parallelism between language
and other cognitive domains has been
receiving wider support as the field of
Biolinguistics began to take shape (Hauser
et al., 2002; Patel, 2008; Knott, 2012;
Boeckx and Fujita, 2014). On the con-
trary, Moro doubts that the syntax-action
analog is at best a metaphor. His oppo-
sition stems from the observation that
functional categories as the major building
blocks of syntax are unattested in action.
Moreover, Merge and Move (Chomsky,
1995) as two primitive operations giving
rise to the hierarchical structure of sen-
tence (in particular form, such as the X-
bar schema), are hardly instantiated in
action. Since other syntactic observations
such as Locality and Island Constraints
(Ross, 1967; Manzini, 1992) are parasitic
on Merge/Move (though they may be con-
sidered extraneous to syntax, e.g., Boeckx,
2012), neither Merge/Move can be real-
ized in the mental representation of action
planning.
It is fair to say that Pulvermüller’s
proposal for the action-syntax analog in
full scale, while promising in its spirit
(esp. from a biolinguistic perspective, e.g.,
Boeckx and Fujita, 2014), is not rigor-
ously argued, given the elusive relation
between action and syntax which under-
lies the inquiry. As Moro correctly points
out, actions are subject to physical con-
ditions, whereas syntax is part of mental
representation. Even if action planning is
considered instead, it is constrained by
how the theory of spatial memory inter-
acts with the environment and situation.
Pulvermüller’s description of a daily rou-
tine of someone walking into the bath-
room, opening the bathroom light, walk-
ing to the basin, picking up the toothbrush
and brushing his teeth, etc., represents a
fixed sequence of events stored in the long-
term procedural memory. This procedure
is incomparable with online sentence pro-
cessing which requires continuous access
to working memory, and not to mention,
the theory of syntax as implicit knowledge.
Pulvermüller’s cherry-picked example is
therefore misleading.
However, Pulvermüller’s misconcep-
tion is not unique, as it stems from
linguists’ oblivion of the granularity
mismatch problem (GMP) (Poeppel and
Embick, 2005) and, moreover, what the
current syntactic theory offers. On the
other hand, Moro’s conviction that syntax
of action is a metaphor does not add any
scientific value to the discussion, since the
operations in syntactic theory are also
metaphorical. I am doubtful whether
syntacticians agree on the foundation
of Merge/Move, or simply employ them
out of fashion. While Merge/Move are
theoretical constructs, speakers do not
virtually “merge” (i.e., “to combine or
to join together”) grammatical objects
to form a constituent in the mental rep-
resentation, or “move” (i.e., “to change
the position of”) a word from one posi-
tion to another (e.g., in the derivation of
wh-questions). Merge/Move are merely
metaphorical expressions which offer one
particular vision to describe the deriva-
tion/representation of a sentence. One can
simply discard Merge/Move and propose,
for instance, a generalized mapping theory
of syntax without any loss of descriptive
power. For instance, instead of postulating
the operation Merge (the, cat), one can
say that “the” maps with a position Det
which is structurally adjacent to another
position N which is further mapped by
“cat,” and the two positions constitute
a conceptual grouping. If an element is
mapped with two (or more) positions in
the same computational space, it underlies
the concept of Move. Further generalizing
this, syntactic computation can be reduced
to a list of: (i) concept-bearing linguistic
objects, (ii) grammatical positions, (iii)
mapping relations between objects and
positions, (iv) instructions for concep-
tual grouping. To illustrate, consider the
wh-question “who did John see?” (i) con-
sists of the set {who, did, John, see}, (ii)
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consists of the set of positions {N1, T,
N2, V}, (iii) consists of the set of ordered
mappings {(who, N1), (did, T), (John, N2),
(see, V)}, and (iv) instructs that {N1, T},
{N1, V}, {N2, V}, and {T, V} are the set
of conceptual groupings. Note that the
conceptual grouping {N1, T}, {N1, V} is
tantamount to saying that “who” moves
from the base position to the sentence-
initial position. Assuming that (i–iv)
underlie syntactic computation, we will
understand that not only Merge/Move,
but also tree diagrams, are metaphorical
and can be deconstructed. Indeed, once we
start practicing trees, we are constrained
by a single perspective of analysis, and an
alternative scenario is missed. Whether we
are able to generalize from the plethora of
metaphors in syntax relies heavily on the
academic upbringing. As a mentor once
educated me, syntax can be done without
resort to trees, as the tree-drawing practice
inevitably incorporates the input-output
metaphor (Boland, 2005). There are def-
initely virtues of using trees and terms
like Merge/Move as syntax merits a lingua
franca. However, these operations may not
be translatable in other cognitive domains.
To solve the puzzle of GMP in the inquiry
of syntax-action analog, one would need
to restudy or reduce sui generis operations
to domain-generic concepts.
To conclude, the GMP needs to be
resolved before the syntax-action analog
turns out to be a just-so story. For cog-
nitive psychologists such as Pulvermüller,
it would be more desirable to focus on
nature of hierarchy and chunking in seri-
ally ordered action plans (e.g., Lashley,
1951; Rosenbaum et al., 1983, 2007).
If the syntax-action analogy must be
seriously entertained, one can demon-
strate how the perception/production the-
ory of action (Hommel et al., 2001) is
analogous to that of sentence compre-
hension/production. On the other hand,
the nature of Merge/Move and syntac-
tic derivation remains the job of arm-
chair linguists. As long as Merge/Move are
metaphorical, GMP remains, and whether
they are indeed instantiated in human
action becomes a largely vacuous inquiry.
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